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To answer this question, these criticisms and the evidence supporting them must first be considered in greater depth. Critics of this meta-analysis have challenged the data on which Shewmon based his conclusions, claiming that many of the patients in the cases that he compiles might not have been properly diagnosed with whole brain death in our usage, total brain failure.
They also point out the rarity with which such cases are encountered, compared with the frequency of rapid descent to asystole for patients accurately diagnosed. To point out the rarity of prolonged survival, however, is to admit that the phenomenon does, in some cases, occur.
Whether it might occur more often is difficult to judge because patients with total brain failure are rarely treated with aggressive, life-sustaining interventions for an extended time.
The case for uncertainty about the line between life and death is further strengthened by considering the somatic processes that clearly continue in the body of a patient with total brain failure. Readers not well-versed in human physiology might find this list hard to follow. Its significance, however, can be simply stated: It enumerates many clearly identifiable and observable physiological mechanisms. These mechanisms account for the continued health of vital organs in the bodies of patients diagnosed with total brain failure and go a long way toward explaining the lengthy survival of such patients in rare cases.
In such cases, globally coordinated work continues to be performed by multiple systems, all directed toward the sustained functioning of the body as a whole. If being alive as a biological organism requires being a whole that is more than the mere sum of its parts, then it would be difficult to deny that the body of a patient with total brain failure can still be alive, at least in some cases. None of this contradicts the claim that total brain failure is a unique and profound kind of incapacitation —and one that may very well warrant or even morally require the withdrawal of life-sustaining interventions.
According to some defenders of the concept of medical futility, there is no obligation to begin or to continue treatment when that treatment cannot achieve any good or when it inflicts disproportionate burdens on the patient who receives it or on his or her family. The question [of interventions to sustain the patient] cannot be answered by decreeing that death has already occurred and the body is therefore in the domain of things; rather it is by holding, e.
To summarize, Position One does not insist that medicine or science can know that all or even some patients with total brain failure are still living. Rather, Position One makes two assertions in light of what we now know about the clinical presentation and the pathophysiology of total brain failure. The second is that in the face of such persistent uncertainty, the only ethically valid course is to consider and treat such a patient as a still living human being. Finally, such respectful consideration and treatment does not preclude the ethical withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining interventions, based on the judgment that such interventions are futile.
Position Two is also motivated by strong moral convictions about what is at stake in the debate: The bodies of deceased patients should not be ventilated and maintained as if they were still living human beings. The respect owed to the newly dead demands that such interventions be withdrawn. Maintaining the body for a short time to facilitate organ transplantation is a reasonable act of deference to the need for organs and to the opportunity for generosity on the part of the donor as well as the family.
Notwithstanding this need and opportunity, the true moral challenge that faces us is to decide in each case whether the patient is living or has died.
To help us meet that challenge, the clinical and pathophysiological facts that call the neurological standard into question should be re-examined and re-evaluated. On the basis of such a re-examination and re-evaluation, Position Two seeks to develop a better rationale for continuing to use the neurological standard to determine whether a human being has died. Ongoing biological activity in various cells or tissues is not in itself sufficient to mark the presence of a living organism.
After all, some biological activity in cells and tissues remains for a time even in a body that all would agree is a corpse. Such activity signifies that disparate parts of the once-living organism remain, but not the organism as a whole. They may have been mistaken, however, in focusing on the loss of somatic integration as the critical sign that the organism is no longer a whole. There may be, however, a more compelling account of wholeness that would support the intuition that after total brain failure the body is no longer an organismic whole and hence no longer alive.
With that account, death remains a condition of the organism as a whole and does not, therefore, merely signal the irreversible loss of so-called higher mental functions. Advocates of Position Two argue that this is the case for patients with total brain failure. All organisms have a needy mode of being. Unlike inanimate objects, which continue to exist through inertia and without effort, every organism persists only thanks to its own exertions.
To preserve themselves, organisms must —and can and do —engage in commerce with the surrounding world.
Their constant need for oxygenated air and nutrients is matched by their ability to satisfy that need, by engaging in certain activities, reaching out into the surrounding environment to secure the required sustenance. This is the definitive work of the organism as an organism. And it is what distinguishes a living organism from the dead body that it becomes when it dies. The work of the organism, expressed in its commerce with the surrounding world, depends on three fundamental capacities:. Openness to the world, that is, receptivity to stimuli and signals from the surrounding environment.
The ability to act upon the world to obtain selectively what it needs. The basic felt need that drives the organism to act as it must, to obtain what it needs and what its openness reveals to be available. To preserve itself, an organism must be open to the world. Such openness is manifested in different ways and at many levels.
In higher animals, including man, it is evident most obviously in consciousness or felt awareness, even in its very rudimentary forms. An organism that behaves in such a way cannot be dead. Self-preserving commerce with the world, however, involves more than just openness or receptivity.
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Spontaneous breathing is an indispensable action of the higher animals that makes metabolism—and all other vital activity—possible. Experiencing a felt inner need to acquire oxygen and to expel carbon dioxide and perceiving the presence of oxygen in its environment, a living body is moved to act on the world by contracting its diaphragm so that air will move into its lungs. An organism that breathes spontaneously cannot be dead. This need does not have to be consciously felt in order to be efficacious in driving respiration. It is clearly not consciously felt in a comatose patient who might be tested for a remaining rudimentary drive e.
As a vital sign, the spontaneous action of breathing can and must be distinguished from the technologically supported, passive condition of being ventilated i. The natural work of breathing, even apart from consciousness or self-awareness, is itself a sure sign that the organism as a whole is doing the work that constitutes—and preserves—it as a whole.
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In contrast, artificial, non-spontaneous breathing produced by a machine is not such a sign. It does not signify an activity of the organism as a whole.
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It is not driven by felt need, and the exchange of gases that it effects is neither an achievement of the organism nor a sign of its genuine vitality. For this reason, it makes sense to say that the operation of the ventilator can obscure our view of the arrival of human death—that is, the death of the human organism as a working whole.
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In fact, it mimics the work so well that it enables some systems of the body to keep functioning—but it does no more than that. Having done this, however, we must also emphasize that an animal cannot be considered dead simply because it has lost the ability to breathe spontaneously. Even if the animal has lost that capacity, other vital capacities might still be present. For example, patients with spinal cord injuries may be permanently apneic or unable to breathe without entilator support and yet retain full or partial possession of their conscious faculties.
Just as much as striving to breathe, signs of consciousness are incontrovertible evidence that a living organism, a patient, is alive. If there are no signs of consciousness and if spontaneous breathing is absent and if the best clinical judgment is that these neurophysiological facts cannot be reversed, Position Two would lead us to conclude that a once-living patient has now died. Thus, on this account, total brain failure can continue to serve as a criterion for declaring death—not because it necessarily indicates complete loss of integrated somatic functioning, but because it is a sign that this organism can no longer engage in the essential work that defines living things.
Although the terms may be different, the concepts presented here to defend the use of total brain failure as a reasonable standard for death are not wholly new. His conceptual justification for this argument was influential in gaining acceptance for a neurological standard in the United Kingdom. He stated in very direct terms that the relevant functions that were irreversibly absent from the patient with a destroyed brainstem were the ability to breathe and the capacity for consciousness. The single matrix in which my definition is embedded is a sociological one, namely Judeo-Christian culture.
And second, does this argument about traditional beliefs, bound to a particular culture, provide a sufficient rationale for a standard applicable to the transcultural, universal phenomenon of human death? Position Two does this by taking the loss of the impulse to breathe and the total loss of engagement with the world as the cessation of the most essential functions of the organism as a whole.